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Abstract
This paper analyzes a model of rational word-of-mouth learning, in which successive generations
of agents make once-and-for-all choices between two alternatives. Before making a decision, each
new agent samples N old ones and asks them which choice they used and how satisﬁed they were
with it. If (a) the sampling rule is “unbiased” in the sense that the samples are representative of the
overall population, (b) each player samples two or more others, and (c) there is any information at
all in the payoff observations, then in the long run every agent will choose the same thing. If in
addition the payoff observation is sufﬁciently informative, the long-run outcome is efﬁcient. We also
investigate a range of biased sampling rules, such as those that over-represent popular or successful
choices, and determine which ones favor global convergence towards efﬁciency.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper introduces and analyzes a simple model of rational word-of-mouthlearning,
in which agents use information about the experiences of other agents to guide their own
decisions. Such communication has long been known to be an important component of
brand choice by consumers; it also seems to be relevant for the adoption of agricultural
technologies and other production processes, and more generally to the spreading of fads,
fashions, and ideas within society.
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Consider an example from everyday life. Someone in your department tells you that
one of your colleagues is about to move to another university. She also tells you that she
is sufﬁciently worried about it that she has started to make contingency plans. You decide
that the rumor is probably not true and that contingency plans are unnecessary, but when
you run into another colleague in the corridor, you pass on the story, adding that you do
not think its worth worrying about. Because you are rushing off to a meeting, you do not
actually tell him how you came about the story. And so the story spreads....
The underlying model here is that there is piece of information that everyone would
beneﬁt from knowing, but the only source of information is word of mouth. No hard
evidence is provided, and while people tell you their opinion, they do not give you all
of their reasons, and you do not observe the entire process by which the story came to you.
Moreover,you knowthat you must not believe everythingeveryonetells you, both because
you know that other people also do not necessarily have hard evidence, and also because
you know that people overlay their personal hopes and fears on what they report.
What is long-run outcome of such a process of information transmission? Does
everyone learn the truth? Does everyone come around to the same view, be it right or
wrong? Or does the diversity of views persist even in the long run?
This is a question that has been asked by others: Indeed, this is the subject of the
entire literature on herd behavior/informational cascades.1 The main difference between
our model and the type of model studied in this literature comes from the fact that in
our model people only learn by “word-of-mouth”communication with a few other agents,
instead of observing the entire history leading up to them.2 It is clear that in many real
world situations, people do not get to ﬁnd out what the whole world is doing: Often it is
simply too costly to gatherthe informationor the informationis somethingthat is naturally
private.3 And even when there is public information, for example about the popularity of
different cars, this information tends to be about aggregate popularity of different choices,
while agents want to know the popularities among those with similar preferences.
There is also an a priori reason to study the impact of introducing the word-of-mouth
assumption into the models of social learning. As explained in Section 5, our intuition
is that word-of-mouth learning makes herding less likely, as it reduces the correlation
1 See, for example, Banerjee (1992), Bhikchandani et al. (1992), Lee (1993), Smith and Sorenson (2000), and
Vives (1997). Chamley and Gale (1994) and Caplin and Leahy (1994) apply related ideas to study the stability of
the macroeconomy.
2 Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) study models of boundedly-rational word-of-mouth learning. Banerjee
(1993) studies rational word-of-mouth learning in a setting that is not directly comparable to either this paper or
the herding models. Bjonerstedt and Weibull (1995) and Schlag (1998) discuss how word-of-mouth processes of
strategy revision in games can generate the “replicator dynamic” of evolutionary biology.
3 Udry and Conley (2001), for example, in their study of pineapple farmers in Ghana, ﬁnd that most farmers
only know about what a handful ofother farmers are doing, but this group has astrong inﬂuence ontheir decisions.
Duﬂo and Saez (2000), in their study of the decision to join a TaxDeferred Annuity plan (TDA)among employees
of a large US university, also ﬁnd that each person’s choice is inﬂuenced by a small group of others. Finally, while
Munshi and Myaux’s (2000) study of contraception in Bangladesh has little explicit information about the size of
the group that the women talk to, their presumption is clearly that in rural Bangladesh it is unreasonable to expect
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between the observations of different agents. It is therefore interesting to see whether the
herding results survive this change in assumptions.
In our model, at each point of time a new generation of agents has to make a once-
and-for all choice between two alternatives, a and b.4 The word-of-mouth element comes
in because agents consult a sample of N others, and those consulted report what they
themselves have chosen. The relative popularity of the choices in the agent’s sample is a
signal of their relative popularity in the whole of the “relevant” population. In addition
to this information about relative popularity, agents may also receive signals that are
correlated with the payoffs from the choices. This may arise, for example, if some of the
sampled agents report not only their choice but also an indication of how satisﬁed they are
with it. In the informal story above, the actions are “make plans” and “do not make plans,”
and the “relevant population” is people in your own department. The people who you ran
into, including both those who told you the story and those who did not, are your sample.
And what they told you about the strength of their feelings, were the signals.
In addition to the framing assumptions described above, we make a number of other
modeling choices. First, we assume that all agents are ex-ante identical, so that one choice
or the other is best for all of them, but there are unobserved idiosyncratic shocks to each
agent’s realized payoff, so that one person’s reportof a high payoffdoes not guarantee that
his choice was the optimal one. Second, we assume that current decision makers do not
observe the information that past decision makers used in making their decisions. Third,
we assume that agents have a common prior on the mean difference in payoffs. Finally, we
need to make an assumption about what is known about the initial conditions.
In general, we suppose that agents know the distributions, conditional on which choice
is better, over the share of the population who chose a when the process started. A special
case of this is payoff-determinedinitial popularity,meaning that the fractionsof those who
would initially choose a, both when a is the right choice and when b is the right choice,
are common knowledge. As we will see, this case gives us the strongest results.
To interpret this assumption, we return to our initial example. When your colleague
told you the bad news she might also have added that the rumor came from department Y.
If you know the people in department Y very well, you may have a good idea of how
the number of people there who would take the rumor seriously varies with whether the
rumor is actually true; this corresponds to payoff-determined initial popularity. If you are
less familiar with department Y, you may instead be uncertain just how many people
there would start the rumor, so that your beliefs about this correspond to a nondegenerate
probability distribution.
We focus on our model’s long-run predictions. Our main result is a set of sufﬁcient
conditions for the long-run outcome to be “homogeneous” in the sense that all agents
choose the same action (though this action may or may not be the correct one); in
other words there is herding or an informational cascade. This conclusion follows if the
samples are representative draws from the prevailing distribution in society (which we call
“unbiased and proportional” sampling) and everyone samples at least two others.
4 While the decisions in the examples we mention are not completely irreversible, the cost of making the
wrong choice is either very substantial (in the case of contraception or switching to a new data base) or only
knowable after a long delay (in the case of TDA), which make them more or less like a once-in-a-lifetime choice.4 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
Our second main result provides a sufﬁcient condition for the only stationary outcome
to be the one where all agents make the correct choice, so that the system converges
to efﬁciency. The result requires payoff-determined initial popularities, and also that the
distribution of signals assigns positive probability to signals that are informative enoughto
outweigh the prior.
While the proportional sampling rule used in proving these results is a natural ﬁrst
choice for analysis, it seems that people can and do use other sampling rules. In Section 4
we show that the long-run outcome can be heterogeneous if the sampling rules are not
proportional. Section 4.1 considers the effects of “perception biases” in the sampling
process,bywhichwemeanthattheprobabilityofsamplingtheuserofararechoicemaybe
either greateror less than the populationfractioncurrentlyusing it. Section 4.2 investigates
the effects of reporting biases: If samples are constructed from reportsby others, and those
with more extreme payoffs are more likely to report, the samples will be biased.5 Under
several of these alternative sampling rules, the ﬁrst step in our convergenceargument fails:
It is no longer true that adopting the action of the ﬁrst person contacted yields an expected
payoff equal to the average payoff in the current population. More strongly, under some of
these alternative sampling rules the efﬁcient outcome is not even locally stable.
2. The model
Throughoutthe paper, we suppose there are two alternative choices, a and b,w h i c hw e
thinkofasrepresentingbrandsor technologies.At everypointintime, thereis a continuum
of agents of mass 1; a proportion x of these agents use choice a and all of the others use
choice b. Each period, a representative fraction γ of consumers leaves the population and
is replaced by newcomers, so for example mass γxof agents using choice a are replaced.
Thesenewagentshavetomakeaonce-and-forallchoiceofeitheradoptinga oradoptingb.
If an agent chooses a, her payoff is the sum of a term ua that is common to all agents and
an individual speciﬁc noise term with zero mean. Similarly, if an agent chooses b,h e r
payoff is the sum of a term ub that is common to all agents and an individual-speciﬁc,
mean-zero noise term.6 We suppose that the noise terms are i.i.d. over time and across
agents, so that the common terms ua,ub correspond to the “quality” of the two choices.
Denote the difference in quality levels by ∆ = ua − ub. We suppose that agents do not
know the value of ∆; for simplicity, we assume further that ∆ has only 2 possible values,
∆>0 >∆ . All agents assign common prior probability q  1/2 to the event that ∆ = ∆.
We suppose that q∆+(1−q)∆> 0, so that ex-ante a is better than b. As a normalization,
we furtherspecify that the “quality”of the inferior goodis equal to 0, so that either ua = ∆
and ub = 0o rua = 0a n dub =− ∆ > 0.
5 McKenna (1991) says that “A customer who has a good experience with a product will tell three other
people. A customer who has a bad experience will tell ten other people.”
6 The individual noise terms do not enter explicitly in our analysis; they are needed to interpret the signals s
introduced below as reports from past agents about their realized payoffs. Here and subsequently, we will speak
loosely about a continuum of independent random variables. Since our analysis will only concern population
aggregates, this looseness will not be important.A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 5
In each period, the change in the population fractions using each choice is determined
by the distribution of responses in the new agents’ samples and the decision rule of the
new agents; we explain below how this is computed. To complete the description of the
dynamical system we need to specify initial conditions. To this end, we suppose that there
are j + k states of the world denoted by i ∈ I. The fraction of the population that uses
choice a at date 0 in state i is denoted xi(0); x(0) denotes the vector whose components
are the xi(0). In states i = 1,...,j, the quality difference is ∆ = ∆; we denote this event
by θ. Similarly, the states i = j + 1,...,j + k correspond to the event ∆ = ∆,w h i c h
we denote θ. Agents have common prior distribution p over the states of the world,




The simplest version of our model has only two states, one for each value of ∆.
We call this the case of payoff-determined initial popularity, as in this case θ and θ
are singletons, and there is a deterministic map from payoffs to initial conditions. This
case is of interest because it produces the sharpest results, and also because it or similar
conditions are frequently used in this literature, but we will be at least as interested in
the general case, with many states in the events θ and θ, as this allows the relationship
between payoff differences and initial popularity to be stochastic. One explanation for this
aggregate uncertainty is that the initial condition reﬂects the choices of a group of “early
adopters” whose preferences are uncertain even at the aggregate level; for example, the
fraction of early adopters with a taste for novelty might be unknown.7 It is important to
note that we treat the distribution relating initial conditions and the payoffs of the choices
as exogenous. Our choice to view this distribution as separate is consistent with Moore
(1991), who argues that the very ﬁrst adopters of a new technology do so for reasons that
are very different from those that matter for most other adopters.
Turning to the mechanics of information gathering, the paper allows for different
speciﬁcations of the rule by which players draw their samples. To accommodate this, for a
ﬁxed sample size N let Z denote the set of all pairs (α,β) with α and β both nonnegative;
and α +β = N; ζ ∈ Z is then a sample of N players, of whom α use a and β use b.T h e n
µ(ζ | x) is the probability of drawing sample ζ when fraction x of the population uses
choice a. (Note that this probability depends on the state of the world only through the
state’s inﬂuence on the proportion of players using each choice.) Moreover, in the spirit of
the law of large numbers, we will specify that the fraction of new agents who draw sample
ζ exactly equals µ(ζ | x).
In addition to observing the actions chosen, i.e., the sample ζ, players also receive a
signal, denoted s, that may be correlated with the realized value of ∆. At this point we
allow for the possibility that s is independent of ∆, in which case it is of no use to the
agents, but we tend to think that the agents will typically have some sources of information
7 To be more speciﬁc, suppose that early adopters receive private signals of the relative attractiveness of
the alternatives according to known probability distributions, and choose the alternative that gives them the
highest expected utility. The initial fractions using a and b will not be determined simply by the objective payoff
difference, but will also depend on the unknown fraction of early adopters with a taste for novelty. Another
possible story for multiple initial conditions is that an unknown fraction of the initial decision makers chose what
they did because they were offered a large “introductory pricing” discount.6 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
beyond the popularity itself, such as the reported satisfaction levels of the people they
contact. On the other hand, we suppose that this information is not perfect, that is, that the
signals s do not perfectly reveal the state of the world. We will assume that conditional on
the state of the world, and receiving sample ζ the signal received by each agent is drawn
independently from the same distribution. For convenience, we further suppose that this
distribution is atomless, with density f(s| θ,ζ); this is not important for our results but
helps simplify a few details.
Deﬁnition. The signal conveyssome informationif for all samples ζ ∈ Z there is a positive
probability of signals s such that f(s| θ,ζ) = f(s| θ,ζ).
Most of our results suppose that this condition is satisﬁed. (Note that if the signals are
simply the realized payoffs of the choices in the agent’s sample, the condition is satisﬁed
whenever at least one sampled agent reports his or her payoff in addition to their choice.)
We use the standard “large numbers” convention that in each state θ the fraction of agents
with samples ζ who see signal s exactly equals f(s| θ,ζ). Finally we will assume that the
structure of this process, including the rules that generate samples and signals, is common
knowledge.
We assume that observed play corresponds to a pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium of
the game. (Since each player only moves once, and players are unconcerned about the
actions of those who move either subsequently or simultaneously, it is easy to check that
an equilibrium exists, as the equilibrium can be constructed by “rolling forward” from the
initial period.) As a result we can assume that in an equilibrium, all the players know the
functions that specify the fraction using choice a at the beginning of period t in each state
of the world. We will representthese functionsby a vector x(t) = (x1(t),...,xI(t)),w h e r e
xi(t) is the fraction of a-users in state i.
Since the agent knows the fraction of a-users in all states of the world, the share of
a-users in a player’s sample is indirect evidence about the state of the world, and hence
about which choice is better. Of course, the interpretation of this evidence depends on the
way that the actual population fraction x inﬂuences the composition of the samples, and
also on the correlation between the fraction x and the state θ.8
Oncea playerreceivessample ζ heupdateshispriorbeliefsasfollows.First, therelative
popularityofthetwochoicesinthesampleitselfconveysinformation,so thattheoddsratio




Second, players also take account of the information conveyed by signal s. Combining









8 If, at time t,n ot w oo ft h ext(t) are equal, then observing the actual share x reveals the state and so reveals
the optimal choice. But, as we pointed out in the introduction, agents cannot directly observe the aggregate
popularities.A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 7
Players will choose a when p(θ | ζ,s)∆ + p(θ | ζ,s)∆> 0. This is equivalent to the
posterior odds ratio in (2.2), p(θ | ζ,s)/p(θ | ζ,s), being strictly greater than −∆/∆;w e
will denote this critical value by C. Players will choose b when the posterior odds ratio
is strictly less than C; when the odds ratio is exactly C, players are indifferent. Note that
our assumption that a is optimal under the prior beliefs implies that the prior odds ratio
q/(1−q)exceeds C.
Many of our results make use of the following assumption.
Deﬁnition. The system satisﬁes the minimal informativeness condition if in state θ,f o ra l l








The assumption that the realized distribution of signals exactly equals the theoretical
distribution that generates it allows us to compute, for each sample ζ, and each event θ,
the fraction of the players that, after receiving the sample, strictly prefer a:T h i si st h e
probability, under events θ and θ, respectively, that the realization of s is such that the
odds ratio in (2.2) exceeds C.9 In a similar fashion, we can compute the fraction of
agents that strictly prefer b. Our results will not depend on the way that agents choose
when indifferent; by making an arbitrary selection here we arrive at the total fractions
Φζ(x(t − 1)) and Φζ(x(t − 1)) of those who observe ζ that adopt a at date t in states θ
and θ, respectively.10
Thus the fraction of the population currently using a evolves according to






























i = j +1,...,j+k. (2.3)
The remainder of the paper is devoted to analyzing the behavior of this deterministic
dynamicalsystem, and how it dependson the nature of the word-of-mouthprocessthrough
the inducedformof the functionsΦ. Note thatthisis a functionon the (j +k)-dimensional
state vector x, and that the “corners” of this state space (the points where every component
of x is either 0 or 1) are the “herding points” where, in each state of the world, every agent
is using the same action. The efﬁcient outcome is the herding point where all agents use a
in the states 1 throughly j (that is in θ) and all agents use b in states j +1 through j +k.
9 These fractions depend on θ because it inﬂuences the distribution of realized payoffs in each sample, but
since they depend only on the distribution of payoffs, they are the same for all states in a given event θ.
10 In principle, the choice that agents make when indifferent could depend on calendar time as well as their
sample; this possibility makes no difference to the results so we suppress it to lighten notation.8 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
3. Proportional sampling
This section specializes the rule by which agents gather their information to “propor-
tional” or “unbiased” sampling, which means that each agent sampled is an independent
draw from the probability distribution (x,1−x)over a-users and b-users. Thus the distri-
bution of samples is binomial, and the fraction of players who get a sample of ma -users




xm(1 − x)N−m. This is the most commonly speciﬁed
sampling rule, and perhaps the most natural; Section 4 discusses some plausible alterna-
tives.
3.1. Some preliminaries


















This is the expected payoff of a randomly drawn member of the population, where the
expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution.11
Lemma 1. (a) For any sampling rule, U(x(t)) is strictly increasing over time whenever it
is less than q∆.
(b) With proportional sampling U(x(t)) is nondecreasing over time.
(c) With proportional sampling, U(x(t + 1)) = U(x(t)) if and only if no decision rule
can improve on the rule “copy the action of the ﬁrst person in the sample.”
Proof. For (a), note that one feasible decision rule is to ignore the observations entirely
and use a, which is the better choice with the prior beliefs; this yields payoff q∆ so each
generation of new players must get at least this much in expectation. For (b), note that
under proportionalsampling, the feasible decision rule “adopt the same action as that used
by the ﬁrst person in the sample” has expected payoff U(x(t)). Thus whatever strategy
the new adopters use at date t must yield at least this high a payoff. For part (c) observe
that if any strategy yields a higher payoff, then U(x(t)) must be increasing, while if no
strategy yields a higherpayoff,then the new adoptersat date t must obtain exactly U(x(t))
in expected payoff. ✷
Remark. Parts (a) and (b) of this lemma apply either directly or with small modiﬁcations
to several related models. For example, the lemma still holds if new agents “inherit” a
choice of actions from their “parents,” and must pay a cost if they switch to the other
choice: If agents do not switch, their expected payoff is U(x(t)); if they do choose to
switch, they must do at least as well. Also, in the “herd behavior” models where one agent
moves in each period, and agents observe all previous choices, doing what the last person
11 Recall that −∆ > 0 is the payoff to b in states where b is better.A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 9
did guarantees that you are as likely to make the right choice as he was. Therefore the
equivalent of U(x(t)) cannot decrease.
3.2. The basic convergence result
The next two results give alternative sufﬁcient conditions for the system to converge to
“herding points” where the fraction using a is either 1 or 0 in each state of the world.
Theorem 1. Assume that sampling is proportional, that N>1, and that signals convey
some information. Then
(a) if x(t) is such that at least one of its components, xi(t), is neither 0 nor 1,t h e n
U(x(t +1)) must be strictly greater than U(x(t)).
Consequently,
(b) the only stationary points of the system are those with “herding,” in the sense that all
agents are choosing the same action, and
(c) the system must converge to such a stationary point.
Proof. (a) To show that U is strictly increasing over time everywhere but the speciﬁed
“corner”points, we note ﬁrst that in any state i such that xi is neither 0 nor 1, every sample
of size N has positive probability. We use this fact to show that the agents who choose at
date t have a decision rule that yields strictly greater payoff than U(x(t)).
If there is no such rule, then part (c) of Lemma 1 implies that agents can do no better
than to use the action of the ﬁrst agent in their sample. Since each payoff realization in a
sample is drawn from the same distribution, the order of the draw in each sample contains
no information.12 Therefore if agents are willing to choose a when a is the choice of the
ﬁrst person in their sample, they would also be willing to choose a when a is the choice
of any other person in their sample, so a must be an optimal choice for all samples with
at least one a and all possible payoff realizations. Likewise, b must be an optimal choice
in all samples with at least one b. But then agents must be indifferent between a and b







In other words, the likelihood ratio in such samples is the same for all values of s.T h i s
contradicts the assumption that signals convey some information.
This proves (a); (b) is an immediate corollary. To prove (c), note that because the right-
handsideofEq.(2.3)iscontinuous,theincreaseinU isboundedawayfrom0inanyregion
bounded away from the herding points. Since U is bounded above by the full-information
12 That is, the draws are exchangeable.10 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
payoff q∆−(1−q)∆, the state can only remain outside of any given neighborhoodof the
herding points for a ﬁnite number of periods. ✷
The next result shows that if N>2, U(x(t)) is strictly increasing except perhaps at
‘corners,’ even when the signals s convey no information. We provide this result to clarify
the structure of the system, and not becausewe believe that the case is of great independent
interest.
Theorem 1 . The conclusions of Theorem 1 hold if sampling is proportional and N>2,
even if signals convey no information.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
3.3. Efﬁciency
The next step is to try to sharpen this conclusion: Given that the agents will all end
up using the same action, will it be the action that is optimal under full information? Or
more precisely, what are the probabilities of the efﬁcient and inefﬁcient outcomes? This
will depend in part on the informativenessof the signals s.
Let r denote the maximum informativeness of the signals, which we assume (for
notational convenience) is the same in samples of all a’s and samples of all b’s; we













we allow for now that r =∞.
A corner x is a stationary point if agents receiving a sample of all a’s will ignore their















where A∗(x) and B∗(x) are the sets of coordinates of the point x for which xi = 1a n d
xi = 0, respectively.13 This gives us:
Theorem 2. A corner x is a stationary point if and only if condition (3.1) holds.
Note that this implies that the efﬁcient point is a stationary point since at the efﬁcient
point A(x)∩θ and B(x)∩θ are both empty and therefore(3.1) holds. For future reference,
note also that when payoffs determine the initial popularities, both θ and θ are singletons,
so that under the minimum informativenesscondition(see above),condition (3.1)can only
13 When the denominator in either of the quotients in (3.1) is 0, set its value to be inﬁnity. Note that these
conditions are vacuous when r =∞.A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 11
be satisﬁed atthe efﬁcientpoint.However,when atleast one of θ or θ is nota singleton,for
any ﬁxed upper bound r on payoff informativeness, there exist prior beliefs that satisfy the
minimum informativeness condition and that allow inefﬁcient stationary points.14 On the
other hand, for ﬁxed prior beliefs, there are no inefﬁcientstationary points if the maximum
informativeness r exceeds some ﬁnite lower bound.
Theorem 2 tells us only about the existence of inefﬁcient stationary points, and not the
degree of inefﬁciency, which (since all these stationary points are corners) is determined
by the probability that all agents are making the wrong choice. An easy calculation
shows that this probability is bounded above by C/(C + r), so that it shrinks to 0 as the
informativenessr grows. This bound holds for any prior beliefs p, no matter how extreme.
While inefﬁcient stationary points exist, they are never stable, since the system must
move away from the inefﬁcient steady state if it starts at a nearby point which is more









This hyperplane passes through x∗ and divides the set of feasible points into two. Now
consider any pointnear x∗ on the side of this hyperplanewhich containsthe efﬁcientpoint.
At this point the population’s average payoff is higher than that at x∗. Moreover, if the
point is near enough to x∗ it cannot be a corner, so by Theorem 1 a path starting at this
point must move in the direction of increased average payoff, and this must move away
from x∗.
A related argument establishes that the efﬁcient point is stable. To see this, let the









Any trajectory starting between this hyperplane and the efﬁcient point must converge to
the efﬁcient point, since the population’s average payoff is nondecreasing over time and
(by construction) there no other stationary points on that side of the hyperplane.
Theorem 3. Every inefﬁcient stationary point is neither stable nor unstable. The efﬁcient
steady state is stable.
Finally, recall that if there is payoff-determined initial popularity (i.e., only two states
of the world) the minimal informativeness condition implies that (3.1) is only satisﬁed at
the efﬁcient point.
14 The inefﬁcient stationary points resemble the herding in Banerjee (1992) and Bhikchandani et al. (1992),
with the difference that here the mistaken “herd” does not arise from the early movers having received misleading
observations, but rather from uncertainty about the initial position of the system.12 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
Lemma 2. With only two states, and under any sampling rule, neither (0,1) nor (0,0)
is a stationary point of system (2.3), and (1,1) is not a stationary point if the minimal
informativenessconditionissatisﬁed.Moreover,withtwo statesandproportionalsampling
the movement from each of these points results in an increase in U.
Theorem 4. Under proportional sampling, if N>1, the minimal informativeness
condition is satisﬁed, signals convey some information, and there is payoff-determined
initial popularity, then from any initial position the system converges to the efﬁcient point
(1,0). Moreover, the average efﬁciency U is strictly increasing along every trajectory.
Proof. Lemmas 1 and 2 and Theorem 1 show that U is a strict Lyapunov function for the
system. Since the system evolution equation is continuous, and the system variable lies in
a compact space, the conclusion follows. ✷
The keys to this proof are that
(a) there is a simple strategy that new decision makers can use that yields as much as the
average in the current population, and
(b) by using more information, the agent can obtain more than this average.
For expositional clarity, the version of the theorem stated is a bit weaker than necessary:
Theorem 4 would be true under weaker conditions in the case where N>2.15 Also note
that the convergenceresult obtains if the quality of the signals varies across the population,
so long as each agent knows the rule that generates his observations.
3.4. The case N = 1
Toconcludethis sectionweanalyzethecase N = 1 insomedetail,bothtoshowwhythe
hypothesis N>1 is needed in Theorem 1, and to illustrate the workings of the model. For
simplicity, we stick with the case of only two states, and we suppose that the payoff signal
is the realized payoff of the person they contact. We further suppose that the payoffs to a
and b in states θ and θ respectively are distributed according to the densities f a,f b,fa,
and f b, with all the densities having support on the same interval.











where λ is the interim odds ratio deﬁned in (2.1) and ρa(s) is the ratio of the likelihoods
of the signal s in the two states. Likewise, the posterior odds ratio following a sample of b
is λbρb(s),w h e r eρb(s) = f b(s)/f b(s). We assume that this latter ratio is bounded above
15 It would sufﬁce that signals in the sample ζ = (N,0) satisfy minimal informativeness, even if the signals in
other samples conveyed no information. This is allowed by our model but does not seem plausible.A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 13
and below, so that a single payoff signal will not change the decision of players who are
otherwise very sure that they know the right choice.
With this sort of boundedlyinformativepayoff information,all those who sample b will











Now that we have determined the agents’ decision rules, we can plug them in to the
equation of motion of the system to characterize the phase plane. Note ﬁrst a key property
of the N = 1 case with proportional sampling: if all agents adopt the action they see used,
then the share of new agents who choose a exactly equals the current share using a,a n d
the system is at a stationary point.
This is exactly what happensin the region satisfying both (3.2) and (3.3). In this region,
anyone who sees an a chooses an a and likewise for b. Hence, no new information is
incorporatedinto the xi’s, and every point in this region is a stationary point of the system.
In particular,the system need not convergeto a corner,and Theorem1 fails, althoughthese
inefﬁcient stationary points are consistent with Lemma 1.
Moreover,thedynamicsofthesystemareeasilycharacterized.When r<q / ( C ( 1−q)),
the herding point (1,1) satisﬁes (3.3), because the most favorable signal for choice b is not
strong enough to overturn the prior belief that a is better. As the information bound r
increases past this level, the boundary of the region where all those who see a choose a
moves below the diagonal. This is the case in Fig. 1.
In the region where (3.3) is satisﬁed, but (3.2) is not, all those who see an a choose a,








Fig. 1. N = 1. Below AE everyone who sees an A chooses A. Tothe right of CF everyone who sees a B chooses B.
The shaded area BEF is the set of steady states.14 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
forsomefunctionsϑi(x(t)) > 0,ands othes hareofa is increasinginbothstates.Similarly,
in the region where (3.2) is satisﬁed but (3.3) is not, the share of a is decreasing in both
states.
In the region where neither (3.2) nor (3.3) are satisﬁed, it is strictly optimal for some
agents who observe a to choose b, and for some who observe b to choose a. Therefore the
populationdoesstrictlybetterthanitwoulddoifeveryonecopiedthechoicetheyobserved.
It follows from Lemma 1 that U(x(t)) must strictly increase in this region. Therefore the
only stationary points are in the region satisfying (3.2) and (3.3), and the system must
converge to this region.
Theorem 5. With N = 1 and proportional sampling, the system always converges to
some point in the closure of the region satisfying (3.2) and (3.3). Moreover, once the
system enters this region it stops, so that the only initial condition from which the system
asymptotically converges to the efﬁcient point is the efﬁcient point itself.
Proof. The fact that the system stops when it enters this region is an immediate
consequence of the deﬁnitions of (3.1) and (3.2); Lemma 1 shows that the system has
no steady states outside of this region. Finally, since payoff outside of the region is strictly
increasing, there cannot be any cycles. Global convergence follows from the fact that in
any region that is bounded away from the stationary points, U(x(t)) is increasing by an
amount that is bounded away from zero. ✷
This observation further illuminates the relationship between our model and the models
of herd behavior/cascades. In those models each agent observes the entire history of
choices made in previous periods, so in any pair of agents, one will observe exactly the
history observed by the other. As a result, certain histories may result in a situation where
after a point, no agent can do better than to imitate the previous one. In other words, no
agent receives a sample which forces them to make use of any information other than the
social history, which is similar to the behavior of our system at the inefﬁcient steady states
when N = 1. By contrast, if N is greater than 1 in our framework, some agents receive
a signal of the social history that is noisy enough that they will make use of additional
information if any is available.
4. Alternative sampling rules
So far we have considered the “proportional” sampling rule, under which the odds of
samplingana-userexactlyequaltheshareofthepopulationusing a.Thissectionexamines
some alternativesamplingrules, bothbecausetheymaybe equallyplausiblein some cases,
andbecausethisletsusidentifytherolethatproportionalsamplingplaysin ourresults. The
ﬁrst modiﬁcation of the sampling rule allows for what we call “perception bias,” meaning
that the probability h(x) of sampling an a-user is independent of the payoff to a but need
not equal the share x of a-users in the population. The second alternative we consider
allows for “reporting bias,” in which people are more or less likely to talk about theirA. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 15
experience with a choice if they were satisﬁed with it. In accordance with our rational-
Bayesian methodology, we suppose that agents know the likelihood function generating
their signals, so they are not “misled” by the biases in sampling. However, the biases can
still alter the dynamics of social learning, because they change the information available
to the agents. In particular, it is no longer true that adopting the action of the ﬁrst person
contacted yields an expected payoff equal to the average payoff in the current population,
so Lemma 1 no longer applies, and we will see that the conclusions of our theorems fail to
hold.
As the ﬁrst example of a non-proportional rule, suppose that the numbers of a’s and
b’s are the same in each agent’s sample and at every point in time. In this “ﬁxed-sample-
composition” model, the relative popularity of the two choices conveys no information.
Consequently, each generation of new agents faces exactly the same decision problem,
namely to choose an action using only the information revealed by the signals, which need
not reveal the true state. Hence in every period some ﬁxed fraction of agents can choose a
evenin statesoftheworldwhere b isbetter,so thelong-runoutcomecanbeheterogeneous;
indeed the outcome will be heterogeneous unless the signals reveal the true state with
probabilityone.Thisshowsthat theinformationprovidedbythein-samplepopularitymust
play a key role in determining whether the system moves towards homogeneity.
4.1. Perception biases
Now consider a more general class of sampling rules that correspond to “perception
bias.” Speciﬁcally, let the probability of sampling an a user when fraction x of the
populationusesa beh(x),with h acontinuouslydifferentiablefunctionsuchthath(0) = 0,
h(1) = 1, h   0, and h(x) +h(1− x)= 1. As motivation, it seems plausible that a single
person wearing black in a crowd of a thousand others wearing white is more likely to be
in everyone’ssample than would be warranted by unbiased sampling. Conversely, perhaps
someone wearing light gray in a crowd of people wearing white may not get noticed as
being different and therefore may be undersampled.16 As before, each member of the
sample is an i.i.d. draw—this precludes a conscious effort to have some of each choice











The ﬁxed-sample-composition example discussed above is a particular version of this
kind of sampling rule with h(x) = 1/2f o ra l lx  = 0,1. This example shows that with
biased sampling inefﬁcient outcomes can be globally stable. Our more general results here
concern local as opposed to global stability.
Theorem 6. (a) If h(x)N >x for x near 0( severe oversampling of rare actions),
then the efﬁcient outcome is not even locally stable if payoff information has bounded
informativeness.
16 This assumes that people do not choose how they are going to sample.16 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
(b) If h(x)N >xfor x near 1, then the efﬁcient outcome is locally stable for any N if
payoff information has bounded informativeness.
(c) For any h function, and any ε>0, every generation of new agents has expected
payoff within ε of the full information outcome if N is sufﬁciently large.17
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
4.2. Reporting biases
Finally consider what may be the most plausible source of nonproportional sampling,
over-reporting by agents with very high or very low payoffs.18 This sort of reporting bias
has two different effects. First, depending on how the sampling is modeled, there may be
some agents who observe no other agents at all. An agent with such a sample will continue
to hold the prior beliefs, and hence will chose a; this adds an impetus in the direction of
“herding.”Thesecondeffectarisesfrompotentialasymmetriesintheprobabilityofhearing
from very satisﬁed and very dissatisﬁed agents. For example, if only very satisﬁed agents
send signals, then in the neighborhood of the efﬁcient point, the more popular choice will
be oversampled relative to its frequency in the population.
Earlier versions of this paper present a speciﬁc example of a case where players are
more likely to report if they have high payoffs. We will not present the details here, as all
that is important for our general result is that the probability of sampling an a-user when
the state is i ∈ θ is h(x) > x for 0 <x<1, while the probability of sampling an a-user is
less than its population share when the state is in θ.
Now in the neighborhood of the efﬁcient outcome, oversampling the efﬁcient choice is
the same as oversampling the popular choice. However, it is easy to see that oversampling
the efﬁcient choice is not the same as oversampling the more prevalent choice in the
region where all the xi’s are greater than 1/2. As a result the two sampling rules have
different consequences: Oversampling the popular choice can permit a steady state where
the fraction of a-users is greater than 1/2 in every state of the world, while as we now
demonstrate, oversampling the efﬁcient choice leads the system to globally converge to
efﬁciency.
Theorem 7. Suppose that the rule used for sampling is as follows: in state i ∈ θ,t h e
probability of getting an a in any single drawing is h(x) > x, x ∈ (0,1). In state i ∈ θ,t h e
probability of getting an a in any single drawing is h(x) <x, x ∈ (0,1). Then the system
converges to the efﬁcient outcome from any initial position.
Proof. Suppose the probability of sampling an a-user is h(x) > x in θ,a n dh(x) <x
in θ. If players adopt the action of the ﬁrst agent in their sample, their expected payoff
is qh(x1(t))∆ − (1 − q)(1 − h(x2(t)))∆, and this exceeds U(x(t)) unless x1(t) = 1a n d
x2(t) = 0. Since expected payoffs are strictly increasing except at the efﬁcient outcome,
the efﬁcient outcome is globally stable. ✷
17 We thank David Levine for pointing this out to us.
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Note that this result holds even with multiple states of the world, and without a minimal
informativenesscondition.Thereasonisthatherethesimple rule“copytheﬁrstpersonyou
meet”guaranteesthatplayersdobetterthanthe currentstate unlessthecurrentstate is fully
efﬁcient, while in the unbiased case this rule only guarantees a payoff equal to the current
average. In contrast, if players are more likely to be sampled when they have low payoffs,
we expect to ﬁnd h(x) <x for x ∈ (0,1). Because near the efﬁcient point the efﬁcient
choice is also the more prevalent choice, the dynamics of the system near the efﬁcient
point is going to be similar to that in the case with perception biases and undersampling of
the prevalent choice, and so it is possible that the efﬁcient point will be unstable.
5. Related work
Although the literature on social learning is now too large for us to give an exhaustive
survey here, we should explain the paper’s relationship to a few of the most closely related
contributions.
We begin by comparing the model to the “herding” papers of Banerjee (1992) and
Bhikchandani et al. (1992), in which there is a positive probability that agents will
perpetually choose the wrong action. This contrasts with our ﬁnding that play convergesto
the full-information optimum when there are only two states of the world. We believe that
the key to this difference in the results lies in the fact that in the present model, at any point
of time, some people observe what we call uninformative histories, i.e., histories which
force the decision-maker to rely on his own signal. To see why we think this is the key
difference, consider a variant of the herding model, in which everyone decides in a ﬁxed
sequence, but every 5th decision-maker takes his decision without observing the history
of other people’s choices, and so makes a choice using only his own signal. The resulting
system does not converge,since there is always the possibility of a long sequenceof agents
not observing the history and all making the same choice, thus switching the herd to that
choice. However, the probability that someone taking a decision at a very late date who
has observed the history will make the right choice should be close to one: Since everyone
can tell when an agent failed to follow the herd, people will be able to look at the choices
made by these people and ﬁgure out the truth.
This shows that the inefﬁcient herding of the standard herding model does not occur
if some agents are forced to use their own signals. In the model in the current paper, this
happensendogenously,forexample,whenthe sample is two A’s and two B’s. To introduce
an analogous feature into the herding model, consider an environment where there are m
side-by-side sequences of decision-makers. Each sequence is like the herding model in
that each decision-maker gets a signal and then takes a decision, but unlike the herding
model in that decision-makers in period t, instead of observing the entire history, observe
a random sample of size 2 drawn from the m decisions made in period t − 1. Each of the
m decision-makers in period t is assumed to observe an independently drawn sample. Our
conjecture is that as m becomes large, in the long run most people in this world will make
the correct choice. Intuitively, with m large, both choices will be present in the decisions
made by the ﬁrst round of decision-makers. Therefore,in the second round, a subset of the
decision-makers will observe a sample with one of each choice, forcing them to use their18 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
own signals. This will continue over time and as the number of decisions based on signals
rather than history increases, better and better decisions will be made on average.
Nextwe discuss Banerjee (1993)’smodelof social learningwith a continuumof agents,
each of whom samples from the population of past decision-makers using proportional
sampling. Unlike the symmetric choices in this paper, the choices in Banerjee (1993)
are asymmetric: One option is to act and the second is to do nothing, and people remain
unawareofthepossibilityofactinguntiltheyseesomeonewhohasalreadyacted.Sincethe
number of people who have already acted is a function of the state of the world, the date at
which a player learns that the act is possible conveys information. Banerjee (1993) shows
that the fraction of those who are currently choosing who make the right choice converges
to 1, even though each person observes only one other. This contrasts with the ﬁnding in
this paper, where inefﬁciency can persist when the sample size is one; the main source of
this difference is that in the present model timing is not informative.Moreover,the interest
in the convergence result in Banerjee (1993) is limited by the fact that the measure of the
group that is making the choice goes to zero over time, so that even though asymptotically
most active players make the right choice, most people in the population may make the
wrong one.
Our results are also related to several papers that study the implications of exogenously
given, boundedly rational learning rules in similar decision environments. In Ellison
and Fudenberg (1995), each agent contacts N others (using proportional sampling) and
observes their choice of action and their realized payoff.19 Agents are assumed to use the
following decision rule: If everyone in their sample uses a, the agent uses a; if everyone
in the sample uses b, the agent uses b, and if there is at least 1 user of each choice, the
agent chooses the action with the higher average payoff in the sample. Under this “must-
see-to-adopt” rule, when N = 1 every distribution over actions is a stationary point; the
interest is thus in larger sample sizes that allow players to receive “mixed” samples where
both actions are used. In such cases, the decision rule speciﬁes that players ignore the
relative popularity and act as a Bayesian would if the odds ratio before seeing the payoffs
was exactly 1. We now investigate the consequences of using that decision rule in the
environment of this paper.
Fix a sample size N,a n dl e tg>1/2 be the probability that a has a higher average
payoff than b in a sample of size N, conditional on event θ. With the speciﬁed decision
rule, g is also the fraction of agents with intermediate samples that choose a in event θ.
Similarly, let h<1/2 be the fraction of those with intermediate samples that chooses a in
event θ.
If N>2a n dg<( N−1)/N,h > 1/N, then a computationshows that xi is decreasing
when it is near 1 and increasing whenever it is near 0. Consequently, the system cannot
convergeto efﬁciency, and moreover in the neighborhoodof the efﬁcient outcome U(x(t))
is decreasing. However, the simple rule above increases efﬁciency if the system is “far”
fromefﬁciency,and in theboundedlyrationalmodelagentsdonottryto use the correlation
between the position of the system and the optimal choice in making their decision, either
19 The decision environment differs slightly from that of this paper, as the mean payoff difference between the
two choices is itself stochastic: each period, ua −ub = 1 with probability p,a n dua −ub =−1 with probability
1−p, with the mean payoff difference in different periods being independent.A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 19
because they do not have the necessary information or they do not know how to process it.




and one (proportionally-sampled) individual under the same “must-see-to-adopt” restric-
tion that is made by Ellison and Fudenberg; this corresponds to our model with N = 2. He
characterizes the rules under which expected payoff is weakly increasing over time in all
environments, and shows that the rule where the switch probability is a particular linear
functionof the payoffdifferenceis “dominant”in a sense he makesprecise. This rule leads
to efﬁcient long-run outcomes in large populations, which is consistent with our results.20
Hofbauer and Schlag (1998) extend this work to larger sample sizes and consider the in-
duced dynamics in a class of two-player two-action games, where the payoffs to the two
actions depend on the distribution of actions in the opposing population. They ﬁnd that the
dynamics are very different with N = 2a n dN = 3, even though both cases admit rules
that tend to efﬁciency in the one-player case.21
Bjonerstedt and Weibull (1995) also consider N = 2 and “must-see-to-adopt,” but
suppose that players receive a noisy signal of the average payoff of the action they sample,
instead of seeing the payoff realized by the particular player sampled. They show that
averagepayoffsincrease overtime if the supportof the noise is sufﬁciently largecompared
to the range of possible payoffs.
Smith and Sorenson (2000) develop a generalization of the one-agent-at-a-time model
of Bhikchandaniet al. (1992)in which there are severaltypesof agents,each with different
preferences.They show that learning in this model can convergeto a situation in which the
different types of agents make different choices, which they call “confounded learning.”
This confounded learning is superﬁcially similar to the interior steady states of our model
with N = 1, but the two in fact arise for quite different reasons: in Smith and Sorenson,
confounded learning occurs when the history of past choices becomes uninformative, and
agents respond only to their private signals. In contrast, at the interior steady states of our
model agents ignore their private signals and base their decision only on the social history,
as represented by their signal of popularity.
Finally, Bala and Goyal (1998) take the logic of word-of-mouth learning a step further:
They argue, plausibly, that not only do people learn from a small number of people but
also these people tend to be closer to them (in some sense) than the average person
in the population—this is what they call “learning from neighbors.” This contrasts with
our model, where people learn from a random sample of others. We agree that this is in
many ways a better assumption, at least in settings where the overall population is large.
However, Bala and Goyal only look at the case where each person gets to observe an
inﬁnite number of independent draws from each of his neighbors: As a result the law of
20 Schlag works with a ﬁnite population and shows that the long run is approximately efﬁcient in the large-
population limit.
21 Once again, what they call “single sampling” corresponds to N = 2 in our model, since each player samples
a predecessor and this is not counted in the sample size. In the case N = 3, they consider a particular sequential
rule that does not allow for explicit popularity weighting.20 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
large numbers can be applied and the learning from problem is substantially simpliﬁed.
It would clearly be important to try to see what happens if we bring their assumption of
learning from neighbors into our model—this is left for future research.
6. Concluding remarks
The broad aim of this paper was to identify the aspects of the economic environment
that inﬂuence the long-run properties of learning by word-of-mouth communication.
Lemma 1 shows that proportionalsampling implies that the average expected payoff in the
populationnever decreasesover time. This weak monotonicityis automatic in single-agent
models with perfect recall, and would be immediate if the agents choosing at time t had all
of the information available at previous dates. Under proportional sampling, even though
agents do not have all of the information used in the previous period, they have enough
information to implement a decision rule that guarantees them at least the average payoff
of the preceding period, while other sampling rules permit a form of “social forgetting”
with average payoffs decreasing over time.
The paper also identiﬁes situations where average payoffsare strictly increasing. Under
proportionalsampling,this is true at all positionsexcept “cornerstates” if there is a sample
size of at least two and any information at all in the signals, or if the sample size is three
or more. Finally, the efﬁcient outcome is globally stable if there is only one stationary
point. This last condition in turn is satisﬁed if the signals agents receive are sufﬁciently
informativerelative to the number of states of the world and the prior beliefs. In particular,
the global convergenceholds under a weak informativenessconditionif the only aggregate
uncertainty concerns which of the two choices is better.
Weaker conditionsare sufﬁcientfor the efﬁcient pointto be locally stable. For example,
local stability obtains under proportional sampling with sample size at least two. For the
case where there are only two states of the world, it also holds for a much larger class of
sampling rules which allow for biases in the sampling process.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that neither local nor global convergence
is automatic. Local convergence fails even with proportional sampling when the sample
size is one. It also can fail for sample sizes greater than one under some sorts of biased
sampling. Global convergence can fail when there are more than two states of the world
and the signals have limited informativeness.
Our results suggest a few tentative generalizations. First, proportional sampling seems
relatively congenial to convergence to a homogeneous outcome, at least compared to
relatively extreme forms of biased sampling. In the two-state model, it also leads to global
convergenceto the efﬁcient point. A second tentative conclusion is that larger samples are
more favorable to global convergence than smaller samples, both because larger samples
increase the informativeness of the signals and also because a sample size of two or more
allows “mixed” samples. These lead agents to respond to their observations of payoffs, so
that new information can come into the system, while a sample size of one allows only
“extreme” samples. This argument also suggests that it is important that agents in our
model get independentsamples. If everyonegot the same sample (or a very similar sampleA. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22 21
as in the herding/cascades models) then there is no guarantee that some people will get a
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1 . If signals convey some information this is a special case of
Theorem 1. Therefore the only interesting case is the one in which there is no payoff
information at all. We will show that conclusion (a) of Theorem 1 continues to hold; this
will imply (b) and (c) by the argument above.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we will suppose that the agents cannot do better than
imitating the ﬁrst person in their samples and obtain a contradiction. As argued in that
proof, if agents are willing to copy the ﬁrst person in their sample, everyone who observes
both an a and a b must be indifferentbetween choosing an a and choosing a b. Since there
is no payoff information, this implies that λζ(x(t)) = C for every ζ that has at least one a
and one b.
Now consider two alternative ζ’s one of which has na’s and the other which has n+1
a’s where 1  n  N − 2. Call these, ζ and ζ , respectively. From above λζ(x(t)) =
λζ(x(t)). A simple computation using the binomial formula shows that this implies
(1 − x2(t))/(1 − x1(t)) = x2(t)/x1(t) which implies x1(t) = x2(t).B u ti fx1(t) = x2(t),
λζ(x(t)) = λζ(x(t)) = q/(1−q). But we have already assumed that q/(1−q)>k which
contradictsthe assumption that λζ(x(t)) = k for all ζ that has at least one a and one b. ✷
Proof of Theorem 6. (a) In a neighborhood of the efﬁcient point, xi ≈ 0f o ri ∈ θ and
xi ≈ 1f o ri ∈ θ. Since the h function is continuous and monotonically increasing, in
a sufﬁciently small neighborhood of the efﬁcient point, a sample ζ of all a’s yields a
likelihood ratio λζ(x) that is close to inﬁnity just as it does with proportionalsampling.
Thus the assumption that the payoff signal is boundedly informative implies that
everyone with a sample of “all a” will choose a regardless of their signals for all x in
a sufﬁciently small neighborhoodof the efﬁcient point.
Therefore in a neighborhoodof the efﬁcient point, for i ∈ θ,






N >x i(t −1).
(The last of these inequalities step makes use of the condition h(x)N >xfor x near 0.)
This implies that for i ∈ θ, xi is strictly increasing over time in a neighborhood of the
efﬁcient point. Therefore the efﬁcient point is not stable.22 A. Banerjee, D. Fudenberg / Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1–22
(b) As argued above, when the system lies in a sufﬁciently small neighborhood of the
efﬁcient point, anyone who sees all a’s or all b’s will choose what they see irrespective of
their payoff observation. Therefore in a neighborhoodof the efﬁcient point, for i ∈ θ,






N >x i(t −1)
(the last step makes use of the condition h(x)N >xfor x near 1) so that the fraction of
those doing a increasesin all the states where a is the correctchoice. Also note that exactly
the same argument can be used to prove that the fraction of those doing b increases in all
the states where it is optimal to do b. Putting this together with the previous observation
we have the result.
(c) Since payoff realizations are conditionally independent given the state of the world,
when N is very large each new agent can guarantee himself approximately the efﬁcient
payoff by ignoring popularity completely and basing his choice only on the payoff
observations. ✷
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